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Oscar, Derrida’s Cat, and Other
Knowing Animals
Wendy Harding and Jacky Martin
1 When  confronted  with  animals,  Western  subjects  inevitably  cast  themselves  in  the
superior role of knowing subjects who take for granted that the whole natural world is
knowable. Occasionally, though, descriptions of encounters between humans and animals
disturb that complacency. These strange encounters occasion perplexity concerning the
status and the limits of human knowledge. They invite us to query not so much what we
know about animals but rather what animals force us to (ac)know(ledge) that we want to
ignore, or in other words, what is hidden from us in the act of knowing. After looking at
the ways in which two accounts of confrontations with cats pose this problem, we will
examine a series of texts by American writers that explore the gap that our culture opens
between humans and animals.
2 One  such  encounter  concerns  a  strange  phenomenon  occurring  in  a  Rhode  Island
hospital, discussed in the New England Journal of Medicine and subsequently reported in the
popular press.  It  concerns Oscar,  one of  several  cats that reside in the Steere House
Nursing & Rehabilitation Center in Providence. The New England Journal of Medicine article
explains how the normally aloof cat chooses to curl up beside patients a few hours before
their deaths. At the time of the article’s publication, Oscar had predicted more than 25
patient deaths and was felt to be so reliable that staff began to alert families when a
patient received Oscar’s special attention. 
3 A number of possible interpretations have been proposed to make sense of this unusual
occurrence,  yet  none  has  been  accepted  as  conclusive.1 The  production  of  scientific
explanations seems  designed  to  compensate  the  doctors’  inability  to  understand
something that an animal senses “ instinctively.”2 The scientific community’s response
tries to address the feeling of perplexity that Oscar’s aberrant behavior inspires. It does
not match the usual feline profile—friendly, sometimes distant, but always inferior. This
cat  takes  initiatives,  intervenes  in  domains  that  belong  to  the  experts.  He  takes  an
interest in matters that do not concern him and what’s more that are mysterious to
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humans. What does he know about us that we don’t ? Why is he interested in us only at
death’s door ?
4 An implicit conjecture hovers above this puzzling occurrence : in spite of science, there
are  zones  of  knowledge  that  are  opaque  to  human  intelligence,  or,  maybe  more
frustratingly, ways of knowing to which we are not admitted. The strange event is not so
much notable in itself as for the threat it poses to our ability to account for the world. An
article in Le Monde Magazine relaying the American story reaffirms cultural assumptions
by suggesting that the whole episode could be just a scam.3 The French newspaper marks
its difference on this particular point. But in fact, it puts the last touch to the general
atmosphere of denial surrounding the incident—the whole thing is not credible and the
newspaper comments ironically on what to believe and what to dismiss as ridiculous. The
editors of Le Monde know better in their willingness not to know any more. The paradox
evoked superficially by the journalists is taken up by Derrida on a more epistemologically
sound basis. 
5 In the introductory chapter of his last book, L’animal que donc je suis, Jacques Derrida dares
to  explore  the  questions  that  Le  Monde ignores.  Derrida’s  reflections  on  his  cat
complement  and  reverse  the  Oscar  episode ;  the  philosopher  is  more  interested  in
questioning his own certitudes than in speculating about his cat’s knowledge. He asks
what human knowledge is worth in the eyes of an other-than-human living creature. The
capacity to reason supposedly distinguishes humans from animals and defines humanity.
But how do we know that animals do not think ? Isn’t it begging the question to place the
human difference in something that we cannot prove that animals lack ? Instead of a cat
interfering in human affairs, Derrida portrays an elderly philosopher exposed naked to
the  gaze  of  his  cat.  The  encounter  between  man  and  cat  no  longer  concerns  the
inexplicable powers of an exceptional animal but the disquieting experience of meeting
non-human eyes. Although the situation is different, the feeling of malaise persists ; only
it is induced by Derrida’s questioning mind and more minutely analyzed by him. Naked in
front of his cat, he is no longer the acclaimed philosopher ; his knowledge and his mind’s
acumen count for nothing in the eyes of the familiar creature. The exposure to another
animal puts his philosophical knowledge in jeopardy but at the same time opens it to a
form of renewal or assessment. He humorously declares himself ready for the Apocalypse,
for the “unveiling and the verdict.”4 He discovers himself through the animal’s eyes :
Like all bottomless gazes, like the eyes of the other, this so-called “animal” gaze lets
me see the abyssal limit of the human : the inhuman or anhuman, the ends of man,
in other words the crossing of the limits at which man dares to introduce himself to
himself, calling himself thus by the name which he believes he gives himself.5
6 We want to place the following study under the double aegis of the highly charged notion
of “les fins de l’homme” (the French “fins” being interpretable as aims-ends-finality-limits-
extinction, all in one), and the no less intense vision of the abyss (both bottomless chasm
and pre-Creation chaos). What limits must humans cross or forgo crossing in order to
hold their  own in front of  an animal ?  What is  human and what is  beyond human ?
Encounters with animals can be definitional in the sense that they confront humans with
confusing  borders  where  they  perceive  what  lies  beyond  the  limits  of  their  nature,
without the consolation of knowing where they stand. This is the initial position that
Derrida adopts in L’animal que donc je suis. He then proceeds to review some major texts
about animals in the philosophical literature, including, more extensively, Heidegger in
his last chapter, to conclude that they bring no final answer as to where we stand in
relation to animals. Our knowledge is unavailing when it comes to certain situations in
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existence,  death and dying most prominently among them. He insists that the whole
“question of being” or of the “ontological difference” needs to be radically reinterpreted.6
This conclusion is infinitely touching and honest but it is also an (inevitable ?) evasion.
7 Human beings are clearly incapable of meeting other species on their terms. Inevitably,
we process animals and the world in the image-making factory of our cultural system. We
convert whatever we consider as outside the limits of the human in terms of our personal
or collective needs. Various ontological (or species-specific) a priori make the conversion
not only easy but also conceptually justified. In the naturalistic perspective identified by
Descola,7 animals are seen as different from humans, as less than us. We assume that they
lack  what  we  have  as  our  cultural  heritage :  the  capacity  to  represent  our  own
predicament.  We  see  them  as  guided  by  instincts  that  prevent  them  from  availing
themselves of the capacity to weigh alternatives and choose among them. Consequently,
we  consider  ourselves  as  responsible  for  them,  and we justify  our stewardship  over
animals by proclaiming our benevolence. Although this conception is ingrained in the
Western consciousness, new developments in biology and ethology suggest that animals
are capable of building conceptual universes. Whether we accept the older or the more
recent conception, it is clear that encounters between humans and animals are like blind
dates in which both parties respond according to pre-defined scenarios, and consequently
that direct comprehension is impossible.
8 If von Uexkhul is right that human and other than human animals inhabit distinct though
intersecting  umweldts,  whatever  is  situated  outside  or  beyond  our  respective  world
pictures is inaccessible, or rather the moment we attempt to comprehend other animals,
we automatically reconvert them into our own system. Yet what is  intriguing in the
literature  on  animals  is  the  way  in  which  they  are  seen  to  possess,  and  sometimes
surpass, distinctive human capacities, while strangely altering and transmogrifying them.
Animals are like us and yet not like us ; as such, they appear as teasing enigmas that beg
to be deciphered. This is the origin of Derrida’s inquiry and the cause of the discomfort
that is often felt in the presence of animals. Although culturally manacled in our relations
with non-humans, we instinctively sense that what lives beyond our human sphere is
crucial to our survival, if only because the “beyond” can become a potential threat. The
ecological problem is of course initially posed in these terms. Oscar and Derrida’s cat raise
another  question  that  is  less  frequently  evoked.  As  Derrida  justly  perceives,  animal
encounters  confront  us  with  the  imperious  necessity  to  legitimize  our  culture,  our
knowledge of the world, and our status as human beings.
9 Those enigmatic cats not only reveal the limits of our knowledge but they suggest also
that it is not an endowment that we acquire, accumulate and transfer, but something that
supports or validates our existence. Without knowledge, we are naked, or perhaps we
have always been naked. Without knowledge we become non-existent. As the story of
Oscar shows, when it comes to confronting death, one of the most basic facts of existence,
we are defenseless or in a position scarcely more favorable than animals. Both Oscar’s
story and Derrida’s cat seem to demonstrate that our culture, our self-justifying image
factory,  is  an  extremely  complex  construction  designed  to  make  us  forget  or  avoid
conceptualizing  our  mortality.  Death  is  always  under  erasure ;  in  other  words,  we
conceptualize in order not to think about it. Nevertheless, certain circumstances cause
anthropocentric schemata to malfunction.  In relating extreme or unusual  encounters
with  animals,  certain  American  writers  succeed  in  opening  up  a  breach  in  the
fortifications of our anthropocentric knowledge.
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10 Barry Lopez’sessay “A Presentation of Whales” is an example of a text that shatters our
pretensions to mastery through knowledge. It relates the circumstances following the
discovery of forty-one sperm whales stranded on a stretch of the Oregon coast in 1979.
The  essay  recounts  the  varied  reactions  of  government  officials,  the  scientific
community, the press, and the public to the deaths of these massive animals. No one
seems able to furnish a satisfactory response. Rather than taking a stand or adopting a
theory about  the event,  the essay depicts  a  series  of  unconnected scenes  and relays
different accounts of the event. In some passages, it reproduces the montage effect of a
documentary film :
By midnight,  the curious and the awed were crowded on the beach, cutting the
night with flashlights. Drunks, ignoring the whales’ sudden thrashing, were trying
to walk up and down on their backs. A collie barked incessantly ; flash cubes burst
at the huge, dark forms. Two men inquired about reserving some of the teeth, for
scrimshaw. A federal agent asked police to move people back, and the first mention
of disease was in the air. Scientists arrived with specimen bags and rubber gloves
and fishing knives. Greenpeace members, one dressed in a bright orange flight suit,
came with a large banner. A man burdened with a television camera labored over
the foredune after them. They wished to tie a rope to one whale’s flukes, to drag it
back into the ocean. The police began to congregate with the scientists, looking for
a rationale to control the incident. (Lopez, 119-20)
11 This series of short declarative sentences describing the spectators’ reactions illustrates
the  inadequacy  of  socio-cultural  codes  in  the  face  of  the  colossal  demonstration  of
mortality. In the absence of authorial comment, no attitude seems to have preference
over another. No one, from the drunks to the scientists, from the environmentalists to
the police has a useful reply to the whales’ obvious distress. Even the best-intentioned
actions are shown to be ludicrously inadequate,  even somehow indecent.  The human
community turns the whales into objects, into news, into scientific data, and finally, into
waste  for  disposal.  In  dealing  with  the  whales’  vulnerable  flesh,  the  humans  seem
increasingly inhumane. All the reactions, from science to sensationalistic journalism, are
like so many screens erected to protect onlookers from a glaring yet unacceptable truth.
12 Just  what  is  being  presented  to  the  onlookers,  and  by  extension  to  readers,  in  “A
Presentation of Whales” ? The choice of the intriguing title suggests that Lopez’s essay
wants  to  do  much  more  than  simply  relate  an  event.  The  primary  meaning  of
“presentation” is a gift, offered in a formal ceremony. But the event cannot be justified as
a valuable opportunity for gathering scientific data, for the essay places this normally
laudable human pursuit on a par with other forms of acquisition :
The temptation to possess—a Polaroid of oneself standing over a whale, a plug of
flesh  removed  with  a  penknife,  a  souvenir  squid  beak  plucked  deftly  from  an
exposed intestine by a scientist—was almost palpable in the air (Lopez, 129).
13 A presentation is also a display, a revelation of presence. The whales’ stranding links the
gruesome evidence of mortality—the colossal bodies being dissected with chain saws, the
gallons of blood, the innards strewn on the beach—to evocations of mystery : “ No one
knows why whales strand” (Lopez, 132) ; “The general mystery is enhanced by specific
mysteries” (Lopez, 123). Lopez charges the stranding of the whales with numinous or
inexpressible meaning. Some of the witnesses to the scene are moved and troubled, yet
unable to explain or respond adequately to their discomfort. A graduate student working
at the scene recounts how experiencing a live whale’s reaction to the dissection of his
dead  neighbor  “broke  scientific  concentration  and  brought  with  it  a  feeling  of
impropriety” (Lopez, 139). A law enforcement officer who commands a man splashing
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cool water on one of the whales to move away asks himself, “Why is there no room for the
decency  of  this  gesture ?”  (Lopez,  130).  There  is  something  very  wrong,  the  essay
suggests, in the refusal of acts of human decency to members of other species. The whales
are not of our kind, and yet they are somehow our kin. In the face of the inhumanity of
the  treatment  accorded them,  they  seem more  human than man.  Thus,  yet  another
meaning  hovers  behind  the  word  “presentation”  in  the  essay’s  title :  man’s  re-
introduction to his kith and kin, an impression of being lost and reborn that dawns upon
some of the hushed crowd : “there were hundreds who whispered to one each other, as if
in a grove of enormous trees” (Lopez, 130).
14 Some remarks made by Robert Pogue Harrisonoffer insight into the problem that Lopez
treats obliquely. Having separated ourselves from the rest of the natural world in order to
assert  our  human  exceptionality,  we  suffer,  according  to  Harrison,  from  “species
loneliness” (Harrison,  428).  Our language,  our modes of  representation,  in short,  our
whole culture, both engender and compensate the distance that separates us from the
world : “human beings, unlike other living species, live not in nature, but in their relation
to nature” (Harrison, 426). Conceiving of ourselves as exceptional, we do not acknowledge
the mortal necessity that binds us to the rest of the animal world :“Culture is not the
allegory of nature ; it is the ritualized institution of the irony that puts us at odds with
nature. To say it otherwise, I am at odds with my death” (Harrison, 435). Culture is a
construction that keeps us pacified and secure in the ignorance of our own deaths. The
whales’  stranding presents onlookers with death on a massive scale,8 while stripping
them  of  the  usual  human  forms  of  containing  and  concealing  mortality.  There is
something  obscene  about  it :  something  that  should  be  hidden  is  exposed  to  view ;
something that is obvious cannot be acknowledged.
15 Lopez’s essay seems to be searching for a language with which to respond to the whales’
stranding. It quotes different voices and adopts various styles, alternating passages of
detached,  factual,  scientific  notation,  journalistic  reportage,  grotesque  realism,  and
lyrical  description.  Finally,  Lopez abandons the quest for the right kind of discourse.
Those who might have found the words or the gesture are absent from the scene :
  As far as I know, no novelist, no historian, no moral philosopher, no scholar of
Melville, no rabbi, no painter, no theologian had been on the beach. No one had
thought to call them or to fly them in. At the end they would not have been allowed
past the barricades (Lopez, 146).
16  Although not quite conceding that words are inadequate to respond to the event, the
series  of  negations  in  the  essay’s  penultimate  paragraph  underlines  the  failure  of
available discourses to cope with the sea mammals’ deaths. The essay seems finally to
give up the struggle for expression : “The whales made a sound, someone had said, like
the sound a big fir makes breaking off the stump just as the saw is pulled away. A thin
screech” (Lopez, 146). At this point the writer seems to withdraw, first by quoting an
unnamed source (“someone had said”), and second by relaying a strange metaphor to
evoke the whales’ last agony, substituting a tree for the huge creatures. The pulling away
of the saw reminds us of the humans’ inability to succor the whales and their disregard
for  their  deaths,  as  unmourned as  the tree’s  fall.  The elliptical  last  line reduces  the
monumental animals to “a thin screech”—to the faint noise before a giant tree’s final
crash—and lets it linger without any human response.
17 The human difficulty in responding to death points to a crucial discrepancy between the
act of knowing and our perception of our existential status : the two do not match. The
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ability to know does not prepare us for the act of existing and there is even a suspicion
that they might be at variance. Our existence is justified and enhanced by knowledge but
has in part to contend with it. At the same time, paradoxically, we have founded our
humanity on our ability to acquire a clear perception of our existential status, to think
our existence, according to the Cartesian cogito. In Being and Time Heidegger opens an
escape route by redefining the link between knowing and being. For Heidegger, human
beings,  as  part  of Da-sein,  never acquire full  knowledge of  their  existential  situation
because they are distracted by care which keeps them immersed in the world always
“being ahead of” themselves and condemns them to a state of unwholeness (Heidegger,
1996, 219). We saw in Derrida’s meditation or in Oscar’s case and in Lopez’s essay that the
whole of our knowledge, culture and cognitive acumen are at stake in the confrontation
with death.  Da-sein’s  return to wholeness  consists  in anticipating death.  Only in the
perspective of that improbable reality is it placed in a position of existing to the full. In
being-toward-the-end, “Da-sein discloses itself to itself with regard to its most extreme
possibility” (Heidegger, 1996, 242). 
18 Yet  Heidegger’s  conception  of  being-toward-death  is  strictly  personal  and  even
provocatively  individualistic :  “Insofar  as  it  ‘is,’  death  is  always  essentially  my own”
(Heidegger, 1996, 223), whereas the texts that we examine evince a relational, face-to-face
dimension. The deaths of other beings are indispensable analogues that trigger an oblique
and intuitive perception of what we cannot conceptualize. This idea has been theorized
by Lévinas in God, Death, and Time : “In every death is shown the nearness of the neighbor,
and the responsibility that the approach of proximity moves or agitates” (Lévinas, 17).
The individual’s death is only significant in the way it links him to others. Death and
dying  are  relational  and  sometimes  communal  experiences  that  create  a  sense  of
proximity and a bond of responsibility.9
19 The encounters with animals we have looked at so far call into question any claims for
human  exceptionality.  Hence,  it  is  difficult  to  integrate  into  our  study  of  animal
encounters Heidegger’s well-known distinction in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics.
World, Finitude, Solitude between the three orders of existence : “The stone is worldless, the
animal is poor in world, man is world-forming” (Heidegger, 1995, 186). Even if we ignore
the  fact  that  the  distinction  reopens  the  now  contested  argument  for  man’s
exceptionalism, it places the animal on an inferior footing as deficient precisely in that in
which we would distinctively excel. The impression derived from the texts examined so
far is that, on the contrary, on rare but intense occasions animals force us to discover our
common engagement with the world. These occasions give us an opportunity to affirm
our real nature not as solitary individuals but as members of a community that includes
all other existing beings. In front of animals we are both revealed and threatened, and
also released from human limitations. 
20 Confrontation with wild animals—because they are rare and often intense—can shock us
out of reassuring preconceptions. They can relay intimations that somehow bypass the
confusing  maze  of  representations.  Again  these  exceptional  realizations  should  be
distinguished from the common cultural consolations expressed in threadbare motifs like
“memento mori,” which advises the acceptance of death, or the contrary theme of “carpe
diem,” which urges the affirmation of life in spite of the inevitability of death. The kind of
existential  moment  that  encounters  with  animals  prompt  is  at  the  same time  more
primordial  and  even  brutal.  This  type  of  experience  is  rather  like  the  feeling  one
sometimes has when leaning over the handrail on a very high bridge to look into the void,
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or the sensations that people associate with bungee jumping or Russian roulette. In both
cases, one has the impression that one is just a step away from accomplishing something
momentous because irreparable, as if forfeiting one’s life could become a formidable life
experience. These extreme occurrences suggest that our perception of life is entwined
with our perception of death, danger or destruction, that one offsets and counterbalances
the other, that accepting one involves giving in to the other and that existence without
both is lived in vain. This is the existential complex that we explore now in two literary
representations of life and death encounters, one by James Dickey and the other by Annie
Dillard.
21 In his poem, “The Heaven of Animals,” James Dickey represents the place animals go after
death as the identical counterpart of the places they inhabited in life. In life and death
there is no distinction ; both states represent the absolute plenitude of existence :
Here they are. The soft eyes open.
If they have lived in a wood
It is a wood.
If they have lived on plains
It is grass rolling
Under their feet forever.
Having no souls, they have come, 
Anyway, beyond their knowing. 
Their instincts wholly bloom
And they rise.
The soft eyes open. (Dickey, 78-79)
22 The pattern of echoes in these lines creates heaven as a mirror image of earth. The poem
suggests that unburdened by “souls” or knowledge, animals are already in bliss, in a life
given over to instinct. Nonetheless, it is death that makes this existential fullness
possible : 
For some of these,
It could not be the place
It is, without blood.
These hunt, as they have done,
But with claws and teeth grown perfect,
More deadly than they can believe. 
They stalk more silently,
And crouch on the limbs of trees, 
And their descent
Upon the bright backs of their prey
May take years
In a sovereign floating of joy.
And those that are hunted
Know this as their life,
Their reward : to walk
Under such trees in full knowledge
Of what is in glory above them,
And to feel no fear,
But acceptance, compliance.
Fulfilling themselves without pain
At the cycle’s center,
They tremble, they walk
Under the tree,
They fall, they are torn,
They rise, they walk again. (Dickey, 79)
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23 The poem’s two movements complement and match each other—the transparent living of
the opening stanzas is simply the counterpart of life lived in the donation and acceptance
of death. The expression of animal instinct in the relation between hunter and prey is
declared to be “full” and “fulfilled” knowledge. The poem depicts a timeless moment “at
the cycle’s center” that embraces dualities and overrides the conventional life and death
binary. 
24 As in all binaries (culture/nature, male/female, mind/body, etc.), the second term is the
inferior element ; thus, death is conceived as “non-life.” If accepting the binary implies
the inauthentic existence denounced by Heidegger, then acceptance of death in life or
dying into living, as dreamt by the speaker in “The Heaven of Animals,” means fulfillment
expressed in two modalities. The first describes the complete effacement of identity and
thus total coincidence with the world.  This is not the unmindful “wordlessness” that
Heidegger associated with the mineral order, but the expression of the world’s substance
through a being’s own life : “If they have lived in a wood/ It is a wood.” The places where
animals  lived  become  complete  thanks  to  their  inhabitants’  transparent  existence.
Alternatively but not differently, existence is fulfilled by keeping the two principles of life
and death in an eternally renewed embrace, as in the second part of the poem. Shown in
slow motion, the Dance of Death becomes the apotheosis of life. 
25 Why does animal existence make the realization of the connectedness of life and death
more probable ? The situations created by Oscar or Derrida’s cat or the encounters with
wild animals introduce an essential difference. These animals come to us and look at us
without words. We have no words in return to justify our presence or question theirs.
When they look at us we perceive our own image in their gaze, but that image is not
identifiable.  The  impression  of  being  seen  seeing  is  sometimes  complicated  by  the
perception of a similar perplexity in the animal’s eyes, so that our image is fractured by
its  own  incomprehension.  Existence  is  no  longer  distanced  and  identified  through
representation but presented raw in the alien gaze. It becomes inscrutable and, as Derrida
senses, decisive for the understanding of our status. Punning in his book’s title on the
verb “to be” (je suis can mean both I am, and I follow), Derrida analyses with extreme
sophistication the various aspects of this encounter as being with (“l’être-avec”) and being
close to (“l’être-serré”) the animal (Derrida, 27).  The human subject loses his status as
individualized entity and becomes sufficiently depersonalized as to be able to exist in
close proximity with another being. At the same time, Derrida describes the dismaying
impression of being considered from the point of view of the absolute other,  “l’autre
absolu” (Derrida, 28). These two sets of remarks do not match. How can the animal be
considered as  the  absolute  other  and yet  be  close  to  us ?  This  is  only  a  paradox in
appearance since it is only when a being has abandoned all pretence to distinctiveness
that it can experience a feeling of proximity with its neighbor. “Il m’entoure,”10 Derrida
concludes significantly (Derrida, 28). This is the kind of experience that Annie Dillard
explores in her encounter with a weasel.
26 “Living Like Weasels” begins conventionally enough with a reflection on some of the
characteristics of the species and an assertion of their difference from humans : “A weasel
is wild. Who knows what he thinks ?” (Dillard, 11). Dillard relates two anecdotes from her
reading  about  weasels  to  illustrate  one  of  their  most  distinctive  characteristics,  the
tenacity of their bite. The first concerns a naturalist bitten by an animal that refuses to
let go : “and he had to walk half a mile to water, the weasel dangling from his palm, and
soak him off like a stubborn label” (Dillard, 11). The metaphor illustrates the weasel’s
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sticking power, while at the same time humorously assimilating him to a familiar object.
The second illustration is even more singular :
And once, says Ernest Thompson Seton—once, a man shot an eagle out of the sky.
He examined the eagle and found the dry skull of a weasel fixed by the jaws to his
throat. The supposition is that the eagle had pounced on the weasel and the weasel
swiveled and bit as instinct taught him, tooth to neck, and nearly won. (Dillard, 12)
27 At first the anecdote merely provokes questions about the relationship of hunter and
prey. Later, Dillard returns to this story to explore its existential implications. 
28 Though they start the essay, Dillard claims that these odd pieces of information about
weasels were gleaned after a personal encounter with one : “I had been reading about
weasels because I saw one last week” (Dillard, 12). This observation is of a different order
from the preceding ones. No longer the distanced object of scientific curiosity, the weasel
is identified as a subject, capable of engaging with the speaker : “I startled a weasel who
startled me, and we exchanged a long glance” (Dillard, 12). After setting the scene for the
encounter  in  a  long  descriptive  passage,  Dillard  returns  to  this  glance,  using  her
considerable resources as a writer to convey the impact of the moment :
Our  look  was  as  if  two  lovers,  or  deadly  enemies,  met  unexpectedly  on  an
overgrown path where each had been thinking of something else : a clearing blow
to the gut. It was also a bright blow to the brain, or a sudden beating of brains, with
all the charge and intimate grate of rubbed balloons. It emptied our lungs. It felled
the  forest,  moved  the  fields,  and  drained  the  pond ;  the  world  dismantled  and
tumbled into that black hole of eyes (Dillard, 14).
29 This  moment  of  exchanging  gazes  with  the  weasel  sweeps  away  all  that  has  been
experienced  (or  written  before).  The  world  of  Tinker  Creek,  recreated  in  the  text,
disappears, reduced to a single point that connects the two beings, “the black hole of
eyes.” This encounter sweeps away all other forms of knowledge to privilege a direct
experience of being : 
I  tell you I’ve been in that weasel’s brain for sixty seconds and he was in mine.
Brains  are  private  places,  muttering  through  unique  and  secret  tapes—but  the
weasel  and  I  both  plugged  into  another  tape  simultaneously,  for  a  sweet  and
shocking time. Can I help it if it was a blank ? (Dillard, 14).
30 During the minute in which they look at each other, words disappear ; the tape running
in  the  writer’s  brain  is  suddenly  no  longer  unique  and  personal,  but  blank.  All
remembered and learned knowledge vanishes, as she lives for an instant like the weasel ;
she shares his mental space. 
31 For Dillard, “Living Like Weasels” means abandoning culture, foregoing the detachment
from the world that gives rise to human consciousness and choosing instead to immerse
oneself in existence :
The weasel lives in necessity and we live in choice, hating necessity and dying at
the last ignobly in its talons. I would like to live as I should, as the weasel lives as he
should. And I suspect that for me the way is like the weasel’s : open to time and
death painlessly,  noticing everything,  remembering nothing,  choosing the given
with a fierce and pointed will (Dillard, 15).
32 “Living Like Weasels” also means recognizing the place of death in existence. The skull
embedded in the eagle’s neck becomes a sign of the wild animal’s commitment to the
embrace of both life and death in existence. Imitating the tenacious grip of the weasel’s
jaws is seen as the entry to a heightened form of existence, “a dearer life,” that restores
the continuity between life and death, figured here as the wild roses and the mud : 
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I missed my chance. I should have gone for the throat. I should have lunged for that
streak of white under the weasel’s chin and held on, held on through mud and into
the wild rose, held on for a dearer life. We could live under the wild rose wild as
weasels, mute and uncomprehending (Dillard, 15).
33 In this fantasy of living as a weasel, Annie Dillard imagines crossing the species barrier to
enter another realm of possibility. This psychic impulse replicates the “devenir-animal”
that Deleuze and Guattari adumbrate in Mille Plateaux. 
Becomings-animal are basically of another power, since their reality resides not in
an animal one imitates or to which one corresponds, but in themselves, in what
suddenly sweeps us up and makes us become—a proximity,  an indiscernibility  that
extracts  a  shared  element  from  the  animal  far  more  effectively  than  any
domestication, utilization, or imitation could : “the Beast” (Deleuze and Guattari,
1987, 307).
34 What counts for them in humans’ metamorphoses into animals is the impulse toward
something else,  molecular  living  as  opposed to  molar  individuated existence.  Dillard
admits to the urge toward a more intense form of being, but she pulls back. She thinks
before lunging for the throat of existence. She is of two minds, a human living the dream
of animal life, unable to give up the faculties that allow her to imagine that other life. The
modals in the passage quoted above underline both the attraction of the fantasy and her
rejection of it. Seeing animal existence as an either/or status that excludes her humanity,
she cannot access the fluid state of “ Becoming-animal.” For Dillard, to become animal
would  be  to  regress  to  a  state  “where  the  mind  is  single”  (Dillard,  15),  and  her
consciousness situates her elsewhere, on the human side of the divide.The moment of
blankness experienced looking into the eyes of the weasel is like the writer’s horror of the
blank page. She marks her distance from the weasel through the very act of writing about
him :
What does a weasel think about ? He won’t say. His journal is tracks in clay, a spray
of  feathers,  mouse  blood  and  bone :  uncollected,  loose-leaf,  and  blown  (Dillard
14-15).
35 The weasel records his existence with mute material substances—clay, feathers, blood
and bone—that remain “uncollected” while Dillard imagines, reflects, writes, and gathers
her work into volumes. 
36 All  the texts  that  we have read so far,  nonfiction prose,  narration,  poetry and even
newspaper or review articles are various manners of tackling the problem of representing
to others the strange encounters with animals that we have tried to characterize. Yet
they are fraught with the following paradox—by addressing us in conventional codes,
these texts normalize experiences that were inexpressible in the first instance. Dickey
imagines an animal paradise from which humans are excluded, while Dillard’s text relates
a fantasy of joining the animal world that has been safely textualized. Both texts offer
equally  improbable  projections  of  the  human-animal  relation.  Animal  encounters
confront humans with death in life and thereby hold out the promise of a fuller existence.
Nonetheless, the texts we have looked at so far suggest that we habitually resist that form
of knowing in order to hold onto our human difference. In the quest for liberation from
the humans’ mental world, knowledge is an obstacle ; it blocks the entry to animal heaven
and checks the descent into pure animal nature. 
37 How can we foster an interactive perspective, resisting the impulse to take distance from
the  natural  world ?  How  can  one  overcome  that  “species  loneliness”  that  Harrison
Oscar, Derrida’s Cat, and Other Knowing Animals
Transatlantica, 2 | 2011
10
identifies ? Loren Eiseley seems to point the way in his suggestive essay, “The Judgment
of the Birds.” 
38 To open up to the experience of animal existence, Eiseley first identifies a liminal space
that blurs familiar human landmarks. He begins his essay by recalling that traditionally
men  have  sent  emissaries  into  the  wilderness  to  gain  insight,  but  Eiseley’s  sites  of
revelation are not necessarily distant from human habitation : “Even in New York City
there are patches of wilderness” (Eiseley, 1957, 164). The essay moves from a Manhattan
hotel room, to a path near the naturalist’s home, to a lonely stretch of the Badlands, to a
mountain glade, to end on a sidewalk outside his home. The episodes related often take
place at transitional moments, at dawn or dusk, when the subject hovers between sleep
and waking. Insight comes not so much from frequenting isolated spaces as from opening
the  mind  to  alternative  experiences  and  being  receptive  to  the  moment  when  “the
mundane  world  gives  way  to  quite  another  dimension” (Eiseley,  1957,  164).  To  give
readers access to the alternative dimension of experience, Eiseley begins by representing
the conditions that gave rise to the moments of insight ; thus his essay proceeds through
a series of frames that recreate or simulate these liminal places and moments. Then, to
open the experience to readers he must refuse the temptation to provide closure ; his
challenge  as  a  writer  is  to  communicate  while  refraining  from  imposing  an
interpretation. 
39 In order to guide the reader away from conventional modes of thought, the essay’s paired
opening scenes resemble inverted mirror images of each other. In the first, Eiseley looks
down from the twentieth story of a hotel, “into a series of cupolas or lofts” (Eiseley, 1957,
163). This bird’s-eye view gives him a vision of a flock of circling pigeons and he imagines
for a moment that he is one of them :
As I crouched half asleep across the sill, I had a moment’s illusion that the world
had changed in the night, as in some immense snowfall, and that if I were to leave,
it would have to be as these other inhabitants were doing, by the window. I should
have to launch out into that great bottomless void with the simple confidence of
young birds reared high up there among the familiar chimney pots and interposed
horrors of the abyss (Eiseley, 1957, 166).
40 New York is turned upside down, so that the terra firma of the city streets becomes a
“bottomless  void”  and  the  sky  becomes  a  familiar  element.  Poised  on  the  unstable
boundary between two worlds, Eiseley feels the urge to join the city’s “other inhabitants.”
He is ready to leave the windowsill and launch out into world of the pigeons : “by the
merest pressure of the fingers and a feeling for air, one might go away over the roofs. It is
a knowledge, however,  that is better kept to oneself” (Eiseley, 1957, 167).  This secret
knowledge of becoming a bird recalls Deleuze and Guattari’s “becoming-animal.” It is a
form of  knowing that  momentarily allows one to look beyond the boundaries of  the
human and, at the same time, to come very near to death.
41 Unlike Dillard, though, Eiseley does not subject his urge to logical dissection. He keeps it
in the realm of possibility by situating it in the in-between zone of the inexplicable : 
To see from an inverted angle, however, is not a gift allotted merely to the human
imagination. I have come to suspect that within their degree it is sensed by animals,
though perhaps as rarely as among men. The time has to be right ; one has to be, by
chance  or  intention,  upon the  border  of  two worlds.  And sometimes  these  two
borders may shift or interpenetrate and one sees the miraculous. 
I once saw this happen to a crow. (Eiseley, 1957, 167)
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42 The passage is shot through with words that introduce uncertainty (“perhaps,” “rarely,”
“chance,” “may,” “the miraculous”). Part of the uncertainty of existing “on the border of
two worlds” is that humans cannot pretend to have knowledge of the other side. Yet this
is precisely the zone into which Eiseley’s essay ventures ; hence, the necessity to create
frames which permit our imaginative entry. He depicts a startling encounter with a crow
as a moment when “the borders of our worlds had shifted” (Eiseley,  1957,  169).  In a
mirror  image  of  Eiseley’s  experience  in  the  New  York  hotel,  the  crow  accidentally
encroaches on the boundary between avian and human worlds. Disoriented by a thick fog,
the bird flies lower than usual, so that the naturalist appears to him as : “a man walking
on air, desecrating the very heart of the crow kingdom” (Eiseley, 1957,169). By imagining
himself in the crow’s mental world, Eiseley tries to ensure that readers do not revert to
the normal binaries and hierarchies of human knowledge. He insists that birds and other
animals have their own certainties. Once he has established this point, he can go on to
suggest what animals can teach us. 
43 Three illustrations follow in the form of paradoxes or riddles. In the first the naturalist
stands in the Badlands, a place where nothing seems to live or grow, at the end of a chilly
autumn day. Suddenly, a flight of birds rushes across the sky : 
Across that desert of eroding clay and wind-worn stone they came with a faint, wild
twittering that filled all the air about me as those tiny living bullets hurtled past
into the night.
It may not strike you as a marvel. It would not perhaps, unless you stood in the
middle of a dead world at sunset, but that was where I stood. Fifty million years lay
under my feet, fifty million years of bellowing monsters moving in a green world
now gone so utterly that its very light was traveling on the farther edge of space.
The chemicals of all that vanished age lay about me in the ground (Eiseley, 1957,
171).
44 The naturalist asks us to imagine the place where he stands and to make the connection
between the birds above and the dead fossils underfoot. Again, he creates an inverted
mirror, for the birds are made of the same chemicals as the dead creatures. All that wild
energy hurtles like “living bullets” into extinction. The birds are moving signs of the
miracle of life in the midst of death.
45 A similar insight comes from the episode that gives the essay its title. Waking up in a
woodland glade, the unseen observer witnesses “a judgment on life” that “was not passed
by men” (Eiseley, 1957, 173). The sounds that wake him are the cries of protest emitted by
birds whose nestling has been devoured by a raven. Other birds gather in the glade and
begin to add their voices to the anguished complaint. Gradually, though, “as though some
evil thing were being forgotten” (Eiseley, 1957, 175), the shrieks of distress change into a
joyful chorus : “They sang because life is sweet and sunlight beautiful. They sang under
the brooding shadow of the raven” (Eiseley,  1957,  175).  The chiaroscuro effect of the
scene recalls the other moments depicted in the essay. The animal world holds together
contraries :  light  and  dark,  life  and  death.  These  elements  are  not  hierarchical  or
separate, as in rational thought, but blended in indissociable continuity.
46 In the final scene Eiseley offers a meta-literary comment on his method. Late in the year
on the suburban street outside his house, he climbs a stepladder to examine a spider
building her web in front of a street lamp. He begins to draw a moral from the scene,
seeing her as “a great black and yellow embodiment of the life force, not giving up to
either frost or stepladders” (Eiseley, 1957, 176). He compares her to a doomed but heroic
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warrior engaged in “our final  freezing battle  with the void” (Eiseley,  1957,  178).  But
finally he pulls back from explanations : 
It was better, I decided, for the emissaries returning from the wilderness, even if
they were merely descending a stepladder, to record their marvel, not to define its
meaning.  In  that  way it  would  go  echoing  on through the  minds  of  men,  each
grasping at that beyond out of which miracles emerge, and which, once defined,
ceases to satisfy the human need for symbols (Eiseley, 1957, 178).
47 Eiseley’s conclusion resonates with religious language, so that the naturalist seems like a
latter-day  prophet  emerging  from  an  experience  with  the  numinous.  However,  he
humorously undercuts this elevated image of himself with the fragmentary jottings in the
style  of  field  notes  that  conclude  the  essay.  The  indefinable  “beyond  out  of  which
miracles emerge” is nothing more or less than the natural world, from which men are
exiled because of their urge to master it through definitions. Instead, what he tries to
promote through his writings is a different form of knowledge—what he calls “grasping
at thF05BeF05D  beyond”—which still  implies a individual act of appropriation but does not
necessarily  predicate  its  conversion  into  existing  social  codes.  Grasping  places  the
emphasis on the endeavor rather than on the objective. In the same way, by multiplying
perspectives  on  his  animal  encounters,  Eiseley  keeps  us  grasping,  even  sometimes
groping for, and thus constructing for ourselves an image of what he calls the beyond.
48 Animal encounters bring us to a strange border that is both an opportunity and a leap in
the dark. In their presence, our existence no longer speaks for itself ; we have to identify
ourselves—to say who we are and where we stand. We may assert the dominion of our
science or the omnipotence of our knowledge ; we may try to leap over the borders that
divide us and indulge in fantasy worlds like Dickey or Dillard ; however, the question of
how and where we conceive the demarcation between us and them persists.  Is  it  an
impassable limit that divides incommensurable realms or just a “multiple,  overfolded
border” that needs to be explored, as Derrida suggests ?11 Is it a closed border between
territories or a zone of exchange ? Is there a possibility of fusion or interchange between
different orders or does the barrier itself bring out those differences ? The texts that we
have  studied  remain  undecided  but  they  hover  round  these  questions,  and  their
hesitation sketches out a maze of lines more convincing than all the divisions that we
usually conceive.
49 What is clear is that our knowledge and our very cognitive makeup are disrupted and
invalidated by these encounters. They cannot cope with the challenge that animals issue.
We do not know how to interpret the forms of intuitive communion that engross and
inhibit our power of comprehension except through reactions of escape or emotional
empathy. These unsettling signs of perplexity are particularly pronounced in situations
in which death is involved and which adumbrate under the divide between species a
certain overlap between our respective conditions. Death is life’s shadow companion that
we refuse to recognize. Animals, on the contrary, seem to confront it with simplicity and
draw their energy from it.
50 Born of denial, a feeling of malaise arises from the texts that we have examined, including
Dillard’s  and  Dickey’s,  in  which  momentary  euphoria  is  like  a  paroxysmal  form  of
anguish. Yet this feeling of malaise is not a handicap, a curse or even a challenge, it is the
very tenor of human existence which has to find sustenance in a constant dilemma :
either we answer the call that animals send from the other side of the barrier of species
and we abandon our humanity, or, by cutting ourselves off from those fellow beings, we
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assert our human difference and we lose contact with the bedrock of existence. There is
no escape from that existential malaise but we can confront it tangentially, for example
through  the  kaleidoscopic  visions  that  Eiseley  offers  in  “The  Judgment  of  Birds.”
Multiplying  the  various  reflections  in  the  mirror  of  experience  permits  a  degree  of
insight, a vague feeling of release. Literature can help us avoid the disillusion of science,
but it need not condemn us to another form of desperation, as Eiseley seems to fear :
F0
5B… F05D I abandon science disillusioned and turn to literature like the bull at the wall,
realizing at last that the esoterics and magicians, if foolish, at least have known the
other road was hopeless and that something more desperate had to be tried—but
what ? (Eiseley 1987, 135).
51 As opposed to scientific knowledge, literature leaves room for Eiseley’s “But what ?” and
its specific function is to keep the question open.
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NOTES
1.  A recent article in the Providence Journal reports that David Dosa’s best theory has to do with
ketones ;  however,  the  article  points  out  that  this  doesn’t  resolve  the  enigma :  "They’re
biochemicals with a distinct smell  that is  created when the body’s cells begin to degenerate,
easily detectable by a cat with its keen sense of smell.  But why is Oscar — and only Oscar —
attracted to it ? " (quoted in Rourke). At the same time, Dosa expresses a curious form of elation
at discovering the limits of his knowledge : " “My own intellectual vanity made it easier for me to
reject the notion that some errant feline could know more than we as medical staff did, Dosa
writes.  “I  felt  strangely elated by the notion that I  could be completely wrong.” " (quoted in
Rourke). 
2.  Instinct,  defined by  the  Oxford  English  Dictionary as  " an  innate,  typically  fixed  pattern of
behaviour in animals in response to certain stimuli, " is a problematic term that works to deny
our own animality by attributing human actions to conscious decisions and animal behavior to
innate, genetically transmitted impulses.
3.  " Plus que la mort, ce chat-là a tout l’air de sentir l’arnaque " (Le Monde Magazine, 14). The
article  was  the  starting  point  of  this  essay,  since  its  editorial  smugness  urged  further
investigation.
4.  Our translation of " Je suis comme un enfant prêt pour l’apocalypse F05B… F05D le dévoilement et le
verdict " (Derrida, 30).
5.  Our translation of " Comme tout regard sans fond, comme les yeux de l’autre, ce regard dit
“animal” me donne à voir la limite abyssale de l’humain : l’inhumain ou l’anhumain, les fins de
l’homme, à savoir le passage des frontières depuis lequel l’homme ose s’annoncer à lui-même,
s’appelant ainsi du nom qu’il croit se donner " (Derrida, 30).
6.  "L’enjeu, naturellement, je ne le cache pas, est tellement radical qu’il y va de la “différence
ontologique”, de la “question de l’être”, de toute l’armature du discours heideggérien" (Derrida,
219).
7.  In  Par-delà  nature et  culture Descola  distinguishes  naturalism  from  three  other  ways  of
conceiving one’s relation to the world : totemism, animism and analogism.
8.  This adds another possible meaning to the title : presentation in the sense of making present
something that humans cannot conceive of in time.
9.  There is a possible similarity between Lévinas’s ‘nearness’ concept and Deleuze’s " voisinage "
or Derrida’s " être serré ", discussed below.
10.  The expression in French is ambiguous : it may signify " it encircles me " and " it surrounds
me with affection ", but also maybe " it contains me ".
11.  " La discussion mérite de commencer quand il s’agit de déterminer le nombre, la forme, le
sens,  la  structure  et  l’épaisseur  feuilletée  de  cette  limite  abyssale,  de  ces  bordures,  de  cette
frontière plurielle et surpliée " (Derrida, 52). The discussion can validly begin when it deals with
deciding the number, form, meaning, structure and layered thickness of that abyssal limit, of
those edges, of that multiple, overfolded border (our translation). 
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ABSTRACTS
Man is a knowing animal. Knowledge is his distinctive mark. Yet in confrontations with animals,
particularly  in  circumstances  involving  death,  human  knowledge  suddenly  appears  limited.
Other forms of knowledge have to be taken into account. The case of Oscar, the cat who predicts
patients’ death in a Rhode Island hospital, indicates that animals know things that are concealed
from us. Our knowledge is limited, a premise that Derrida analyses in The Animal that Therefore I
Am, where  he  admits  that  the  philosophical  literature  about  animals  does  not  satisfactorily
justify his human difference. Barry Lopez shows that our knowledge is not only insufficient when
it comes to accounting for the agony of a school of beached whales, but that it is a poor substitute
for our perplexity in the face of death. Heidegger’s analysis in Being and Time offers an affirmative
conception of the confrontation with death. Death ceases to be the destabilizing nothingness that
threatens our existence and instead provokes knowledge. The study of two correlated texts, by
Dickey and Dillard helps nuance the heroic  Heideggerian conception of  death.  Finally,  Loren
Eiseley hints at a possibility that only literature can afford. Instead of attempting to seize the
world through culture or envying animals’ authenticity, human beings can acquire tangential
perspectives upon their world and that of animals.
L’homme  est  un  animal  de  savoir.  Le  savoir  est  sa  marque  distinctive.  Cependant,  dans  ses
confrontations avec les animaux, particulièrement en des circonstances impliquant la mort, le
savoir humain s’avère insuffisant. D’autres formes de savoir doivent être prises en compte. Le cas
d’Oscar, le chat qui anticipe la mort des patients d’un hôpital du Rhode Island, montre que les
animaux savent des choses que nous ignorons. Notre savoir est limité, c’est le point de départ de
la réflexion de Derrida dans L’animal que donc je suis,  dans lequel il constate que la littérature
philosophique  sur  les  animaux ne  suffit  pas  à  justifier  son humaine  différence.  Barry  Lopez
montre que notre savoir est insuffisant pour rendre compte de l’agonie d’un groupe de baleines
échouées ; il n’est qu’un expédient assez faible pour dissimuler notre perplexité devant la mort.
L’analyse  de  Heidegger  dans  L’être  et  le  temps présente  une  conception  positive  de  la
confrontation avec la mort. Loin d’être un néant déstabilisateur qui menace notre existence, la
mort est source de savoir.  L’étude en miroir de deux textes de Dickey et Dillard nous aide à
nuancer la conception héroïque de la mort selon Heidegger. Finalement, Loren Eiseley signale
une autre possibilité que seule la littérature est en mesure d’offrir.  Au lieu d’appréhender le
monde  à  travers  leur  culture  ou  d’envier  l’authenticité  des  animaux,  les  êtres  humains
bénéficient de visées tangentielles sur le monde et sur les animaux.
INDEX
Keywords: Animal, Annie Dillard, Barry Lopez, becoming-animal, death, James Dickey, Jaques
Derrida, knowing, knowledge, Lauren Eiseley, nature writing
Mots-clés: Animal, Annie Dillard, Barry Lopez, devenir-animal, écrivains de la nature, James
Dickey, Jaques Derrida, Lauren Eiseley, mort, savoir
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